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THE OKLAHOMA UNFAIR CLAIMS
SETTLEMENT PRACTICES ACT: A PRIVATE
RIGHT OF ACTION?
Carol R. Goforth*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1986 the Oklahoma legislature passed the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act 1 (the "Oklahoma Act") as part of the Oklahoma Insurance Code.2 The statute prohibits property and casualty insurers
from engaging in claim settlement practices that are unfair to insureds,
and gives the Insurance Commissioner broad enforcement authority.
The Oklahoma Act is based upon the Model Unfair Trade Practices Act3
(the "Model Act") which was originally drafted and proposed by the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners4 (the "NAIC"). Versions of the Model Act have been adopted in a majority of American
states.5
* Ms. Goforth is a graduate of the University of Arkansas School of Law. She is currently
associated with the Tulsa, Oklahoma law firm of Doerner, Stuart, Saunders, Daniel & Anderson.
1. OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, §§ 1221-1228 (Supp. 1988).
2. OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, §§ 101-5005 (1981 & Supp. 1988).
3. MODEL UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT §§ 1-15, 2 N.A.I.C. Proc. 900-1 to -10 (1977)
[hereinafter "Model Act"]. The Model Act combines the prohibition of unfair claims settlement
practices with other unfair trade practices. Only § 4(9) of the Model Act specifically deals with
unfair claims settlement practices. Oklahoma, and certain other jurisdictions, adopted § 4(9) of the
Model Act as a separate act rather than inserting the provisions into the State Unfair Trade Practices Act. This distinction is not significant. For the most part, references herein to the Model Act
are to § 4(9) of the Model Act.
4. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners ("NAIC") is a voluntary organization of state insurance commissioners.
5. The following is a partial listing of State Acts: ALASKA STAT. § 21.36.125 (Supp. 1984);
ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-461 (1987 Supp.); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 23-66-206(9) (1987); CAL. INS.
CODE § 790.03(h) (West Supp. 1989); COLO. REv. STAT. § 10-3-1104(h) (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 38-61 (1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2304(16) (1975); FLA. STAT. § 626.9541(i) (1984); HAw.
REV. STAT. § 431-643(10) (1985); IDAHO CODE § 41-1329 (1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-4-1-4.5
(1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 507B.4.(9) (1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2404(9) (1986); MAss. GEN.
LAvs ANN. Ch. 176D, § 3(9) (West 1987); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 500.2026 (1983); MINN. STAT.
§ 72A.20(12) (1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 375.936(10) (Vernon Supp. 1989); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 33-18-201 (1987); NEB. REv. STAT. § 44.1525(9) (1988); NEV. REv. STAT. § 686A.310 (1987);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 417:4.XV (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:30-13.1 (1985); N.M. STAT.
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Unfortunately, several recurring problems of interpretation and application of these State Acts have arisen in recent years. Some of the
interpretation problems stem from the fact that, according to certain
courts, the various state legislatures did not have the same motivations in
adopting the State Acts that the NAIC had for proposing the Model Act.
One of the most significant issues litigated in a number of jurisdictions involves the question of whether a private right of action can be
inferred under the State Acts. Although courts which have addressed
this issue are split on whether their State Act gives rise to a private right
of recovery, 6 most courts have declined to add remedies not expressly
mentioned in the State Acts.
The Oklahoma courts have not addressed the question of whether
the Oklahoma Act should be interpreted to provide a private right of
recovery in addition to the administrative remedies expressly listed. 7
This issue may be particularly significant for Oklahoma. At least one
author has hypothesized that a private cause of action will or should be
allowed in jurisdictions where the common law has already been modified to permit tort remedies against insurers for bad faith breach of the
insurance contract.' Oklahoma, along with a growing number of states,
has adopted such a modification of common law. Implying a private
cause of action under the Oklahoma Act would, however, put Oklahoma
in the minority with regard to interpreting state enactments of the Model
Act.
Although there are some valid arguments to support a private cause
of action under the Oklahoma Act, it does not appear that the drafters of
the Act contemplated such private remedies. As willing as the
ANN. § 59A-16-20 (1988); N.Y. INs. LAW § 2601 (McKinney 1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5854.4(11) (1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-04-03.9 (Supp. 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 746,230(1)
(1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1171.5(10) (Supp. 1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-8-104(8) (Supp.

1988); TEx. REV. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21-2 (Vernon 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4724(9)
(1984); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-510 (1986); and W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4(9) (1988). In addition, in

some jurisdictions the Model Act's prohibitions have been enacted as part of the state's administrative regulations. See Wis. ADMIN. CODE § Ins. 6.11(3) (1986).

For ease of reference, the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act as adopted by the states will
be referred to as the State Acts or, individually, as the [State's name] Act.
6. See infra notes 27-97 and accompanying text.
7. The administrative remedies are provided in OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, §§ 1224-1226 (Supp.
1988).
8. Sherman & Crowl, The JudicialResponse to Unfair Claims Practices Laws: Applying the
National Experience to the Minnesota Act, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 45, 72-75 (1985). If this
hypothesis holds true, the Oklahoma courts might be expected to recognize a private right of recovery since the Oklahoma courts have recognized that it may be appropriate for insureds to recover
damages in tort against insurers for bad faith breach of the insurance contract. See, eg., Christian v.
American Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1977).
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Oklahoma courts may be to limit unfair claim practices by insurers, inferring private enforcement rights is not the appropriate means for accomplishing this result.
II.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE OKLAHOMA ACT
AND THE MODEL ACT

The Model Act on which the Oklahoma Act is based was originally
proposed by the NAIC in 1971. 9 The Model Act is a modified version of
the Model Trade Practices Law,10 adapted to take into consideration certain present-day problems.
The Model Trade Practices Law, which was adopted by many
states, including Oklahoma, in the years following 1947, contained broad
definitions of unfair and deceptive practices, but did not specifically men-

tion unfair claims settlement practices.'

In contrast, the Model Act

specifies a number of claims settlement practices which should be treated

as unfair trade practices if "committ[ed] or perform[ed] with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice."' 2 In fact, the Model
Act lists more than a dozen separate types of claims settlement practices
that might be deemed to be unfair.' 3
9. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
10. MODEL TRADE PRACrIcEs LAW, 2 N.A.I.C. Proc. 392-400 (1947) [hereinafter "Model

Law"].
11. The 1947 Model Law provided that unfair practices were those which were based on misrepresentations and false advertising, false information and advertising generally, defamation, boycott, coercion and intimidation, false financial statements, stock operations and advisory board
contracts, unfair discrimination, or rebates. Model Law, 2 N.A.I.C. 392-400, § 4(l)-(8) (1947). The
Oklahoma version of the Model Law is codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, §§ 1201-1219 (1981).
12. Model Act, 2 N.A.I.C. Proc. 900-1 to -10 (1977).
13. Section 4(9) of the Model Act provides that all of the following actions may be treated as
unfair claims settlement practices:
(a) misrepresenting pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions relating to coverages at
issue;
(b) failing to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon communications with respect to claims arising under insurance policies;
(c) failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt investigation of
claims arising under insurance policies;
(d) refusing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation based upon all
available information;
(e) failing to affirm or deny coverage of claims within a reasonable time after proof of loss
statements have been completed;
(f) not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlements of
claims in which liability has become reasonably clear;
(g) compelling insureds to institute litigation to recover amounts due under an insurance
policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately recovered in actions
brought by such insureds;
(1h)attempting to settle a claim for less than the amount to which a reasonable man
would have believed he was entitled by reference to written or printed advertising material
accompanying or made part of an application;
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The Oklahoma Act, while clearly based on that portion of the
Model Act dealing with unfair claims settlement practices, is not identi-

cal to it. There are several significant differences between the two versions. For example, while the Model Act identifies fourteen different
practices as being potentially
unfair, the Oklahoma Act lists only six cat14

egories of unfair acts.
In addition, the Model Act prohibits a policy of "compelling insureds to institute litigation to recover amounts due under an insurance
policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately recov-

ered in actions brought by such insureds." 15 Under the comparable subsection of the Oklahoma Act, however, the prohibited practice must
include settlement offers that are also substantially less than the claims
made by policy holders. 6 The Oklahoma statute also adds an administrative requirement that insurers maintain records of all complaints for

three years or since the date of the last examination by the insurance
commission, whichever period of time is shorter. 7
(i) attempting to settle claims on the basis of an application which was altered without
notice to, or knowledge or consent of the insured;
() making claims payments to insureds or beneficiaries not accompanied by statements
setting forth the coverage under which the payments are being made;
(k) making known to insureds or claimants a policy of appealing from arbitration awards
in favor of insureds or claimants for the purpose of compelling them to accept settlements
or compromises less than the amount awarded in arbitration;
(1) delaying the investigation or payment of claims by requiring an insured, claimant, or
the physician of either to submit a preliminary claim report and then requiring the subsequent submission of formal proof of loss forms, both of which submissions contain substantially the same information;
(m) failing to promptly settle claims, where liability has become reasonably clear, under
one portion of the insurance policy coverage in order to influence settlements under the
other portions of the insurance policy coverage;
(n) failing to promptly provide a reasonable explanation of the basis in the insurance
policy in relation to the facts or applicable law for denial of a claim or for the offer of a
compromise settlement.
Model Act, 2 N.A.I.C. Proc. 900-1 to -10, § 4(9)(a)-(n) (1977).
14. OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 1222 (Supp. 1988). The practices omitted from the Oklahoma Act
are: refusing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation; failing to affirm or deny
coverage within a reasonable time after proof of loss statements have been received; attempting to
settle a claim for less than the amount to which the policyholder is reasonably entitled; attempting to
settle claims on the basis of an altered application; making claims payments which are not accompanied by statements setting forth the coverage under which the payments are being made; advertising
a policy of appealing from arbitration awards in favor of insureds for the purpose of compelling them
to accept settlements or compromises less than the arbitration amount awarded; delaying claims
investigation by requiring preliminary and formal proof of loss forms; failing to promptly settle
claims under one portion of the insurance coverage in order to influence claims on other covered
items; and failing to provide a reasonable explanation of the basis in the policy for denial of a claim
or offer of compromise. See Model Act, 2 N.A.I.C. Proc. 900-4, -5, §§ 4(a)(d)-(e) & (h)-(n).
15. Id. at § 4(9)(g).
16. OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 1222.5 (Supp. 1988).
17. Id. at § 1222.6.
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Another difference between the Oklahoma Act and the Model Act is
that the Oklahoma Act prohibits any of the listed acts "by a property
and casualty insurer, if committed without cause." 1 8 The Model Act, on
the other hand, specifies that the listed practices will be deemed unfair
only if committed or performed "with such frequency as to indicate a

general business practice." 19 The Oklahoma Act incorporates the requirement that the violation amount to a general practice only in the

section allowing the Oklahoma Insurance Commissioner to require additional periodic reports from an insurer who is being investigated.2'

An additional distinction is that the Model Act is now accompanied
by Model Regulations which were promulgated by the NAIC in 1977.21
These regulations add specificity to the requirements of the Model Act.22

At this time no such regulations have been promulgated by the
Oklahoma Insurance Commissioner.23

One final difference between the Model Act and the Oklahoma Act
is the provision in the Model Act, missing from the Oklahoma version,

declaring that the Act is not intended to "in any way relieve or absolve
any person ... from any liability under any other laws of this state."'24
The significance of this omission is unclear. State Acts which have included such a "savings clause" have been interpreted as creating a private cause of action, and as precluding the creation of such remedies,

both results being reached because of this language.2
18. Id. at § 1222.
19. Model Act, 2 N.A.I.C. Proc. 900-1 to -10, § 4(9) (1977).
20. The statute allows the Insurance Commissioner to determine from his investigation of complaints that the insurer "has engaged in unfair claim settlement practices with such frequency as to
indicate a general business practice." OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 1223.A.1 (Supp. 1988). If such a determination is made, the insurer may be required to file periodic reports to facilitate closer inspection of
the insurer's business. Id.
21. UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES MODEL REGULATION, 2 N.A.I.C. Proc. 890-1
to -4 (1977) [hereinafter "Model Regulations"].
22. For example, one of the subsections of the Model Act requires that an insurer "acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon communications with respect to claims." Model Act, 2
N.A.I.C. Proc. 900-1 to -10, § 4(9)(b) (1977). The Model Regulations describe specific time periods
for such responses. See Model Regulations, 2 N.A.I.C. Proc. 890-1 to -4, §§ 6(a), 6(b) & 7 (1977).
23. Pursuant to the requirements of OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 1228 (Supp. 1988), the Oklahoma
Insurance Commissioner is in the process of promulgating rules and regulations to implement the
provisions of the Oklahoma Act. These proposed rules and regulations are not based on the Model
Regulations, and do not appear to add significant specificity or detail to the operative provisions of
the Oklahoma Act.
24. Model Act, 2 N.A.I.C. Proc. 900-1 to -10, § 4(9)(d) (1977) (emphasis added).
25. For example, the Arizona Supreme Court held that "this section contemplates a private suit
to impose civil liability irrespective of governmental action." Sparks v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co.,
132 Ariz. 529, 541, 647 P.2d 1127, 1139, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1070 (1982). The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, however, determined that the phrase "any other
laws of this state" contained in the Missouri statute meant that "civil liability will not arise from a
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Clearly these departures from the Model Act do not determine
whether the Oklahoma Act is intended to create a private right of action.
While it appears that the NAIC did not intend the Model Act to include
private enforcement actions, 26 there is no such assurance which can be
given with regard to the Oklahoma Act. It is therefore appropriate to
examine how courts in other states have dealt with this issue in order to
determine how Oklahoma courts might decide the question.
III.

CONSTRUING STATE ACTS TO FIND A PRIVATE
RIGHT OF ACTION

The problem of construing the Oklahoma Act is not unique. Courts
from several jurisdictions have been faced with the question of whether
State Acts can be enforced by private action. Several courts have
concluded that a private remedy should be allowed. For example, courts
in Arizona,2 7 California,2" Montana, 29 North Dakota,3 0 and West Virginia3 1 have all held that their State Act gives rise to a private right of
recovery. An examination of the decisions from each of these jurisdictions is helpful in understanding how the Oklahoma courts are likely to
approach interpretation of the Oklahoma Act, and how the Oklahoma
courts ought to react.
A. Reliance upon the Statutory Language
Both the Arizona and California courts have relied upon the language included in their State Act to find that a private cause of action
exists. In Sparks v. Republic NationalLife Insurance Co.,32 the Arizona
Supreme Court carefully considered the following statutory language:
"No order of the director pursuant to this section or order of court to
enforce it, or holding of a hearing, may in any manner relieve or absolve
violation of the Unfair Claims Settlement Act." Tufts v. Madesco Inv. Corp., 524 F. Supp. 484, 487
(E.D. Mo. 1981).
26. It seems clear that the NAIC did not intend the Model Act to provide such a private right
of recovery. "In any event, the intent of the NAIC as evidenced by the language of the Model Act
and the NAIC proceedings, and supplemented by this Report, was clearly not to create a new private
right of action for trade practices which are prohibited by the Model Act." Report of Director
Robert Ratchford, Jr., of Ohio, "Regarding a Private Right of Action Under § 4(9) of the NAIC
Model Unfair Trade Practices Act," 2 N.A.I.C. Proc. at 350 (1980).
27. Sparks v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 132 Ariz. 529, 647 P.2d 1127 (1982).
28. Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842
(1979).
29. First Sec. Bank of Bozeman v. Goddard, 181 Mont. 407, 593 P.2d 1040 (1979).
30. Farmer's Union Cent. Exch. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 626 F. Supp. 583 (D.N.D. 1985).
31. Jenkins v. J. C. Penney Casualty Ins. Co., 280 S.E.2d 252 (W. Va. 1981).
32. 132 Ariz. 529, 647 P.2d 1127 (1982).
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any person affected by the order or hearing from any other liability, penalty or forfeiture under law."33 The court found "that this section contemplate[d] a private suit to impose civil liability irrespective of
governmental action against the insurer."3 4
Similarly, the Supreme Court of California cited the precise wording
of the California Act in finding that there is a private cause of action
which will support an award of damages for unfair claim settlement
practices in that state.3" In Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior
Court,3 6 the California Supreme Court found that a private right of action existed because the California Act provides that a cease and desist
order issued by the California Insurance Commissioner will not absolve
insurers from "civil liability or criminal penalty under the laws of this
State arising out of the methods, acts or practices found unfair or deceptive."3 7 The California court noted that the California Act differed from
the Model Act by eliminating the word "other" from the Model Act
provision which states that administrative enforcement is not intended to
absolve insurers from liability under any "other" state law.38
This reliance on statutory language is appropriate since the cardinal
rule of statutory construction requires courts to examine the legislature's
intent in passing the statute, and such intent can often be ascertained
from the wording chosen by the legislature.3 9 However, these cases offer
little in the way of guidance in interpreting the Oklahoma Act because
the statutory language considered by both the Arizona and California
courts does not appear in the Oklahoma version of the Model Act.
B. Reliance Upon General Rules for Inferring PrivateRemedies
Perhaps the most thoroughly reasoned decision interpreting a State
Act to permit a private right of action is Jenkins v. J. C. Penney Casualty
Insurance Co.." In Jenkins the West Virginia Court of Appeals applied
33. Id. at 541, 647 P.2d at 1139 (citing ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-456(C) (1981)).
34. Id. This rationale had previously been adopted by the Arizona Supreme Court in Sellinger
v. Freeway Mobile Home Sales, Inc., where the court held that the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act
created, by inference, a private cause of action for certain prohibited sales practices. 110 Ariz. 573,
521 P.2d 1119 (1974).
35. Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d 880, 885, 592 P.2d 329, 332, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 842, 845 (1979) (citing CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h)).
36. Id.
37. Id. (citing CAL. INS. CODE § 790.09).
38. Royal Globe, 23 Cal.3d at 886, 592 P.2d at 333, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
39. See, eg., Wilson v. Stocker, 819 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1987); United States v. Ray, 488 F.2d
15 (10th Cir. 1973); Skelly Oil Co. v. United States, 255 F. Supp. 228 (N.D. Okla. 1966).
40. 280 S.E.2d 252 (V. Va. 1981).
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a four-part analysis to determine whether a private cause of action
should be inferred under the West Virginia Act.
Citing an earlier West Virginia decision,4 the Jenkins court found
four factors important in deciding whether to infer a private cause of
action under the state statute. First, the plaintiff must be a member of
the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted. Second, the legislative intent, either express or implied, must not preclude a private right of
action. Third, a private cause of action must be consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislation. Finally, a private cause of action
must not intrude into an area delegated exclusively to the federal
government. 42
The first problem4 3 dealt with in Jenkins was that the claimant was
not actually the insured, but a third party seeking to recover under the
terms of someone else's insurance policy. From reviewing the West Virginia Act the court found that the prohibited practices were not limited
to activities between the insured and the insurance company. Rather, the
court determined that there were a number of unfair claims settlement
practices which would apply equally to third party claimants as well as
insureds.' The court therefore concluded that the West Virginia Act
was designed to protect insureds and third party claimants.
With regard to legislative intent, the court began its analysis by noting that determining legislative intent was difficult in West Virginia because of the absence of legislative history.45 However, the court
concluded that the statute itself showed a strong policy declaration
against unfair insurance practices. This, in itself, suggested to the court
46
the appropriateness of a private remedy.
The Jenkins court also noted the fact that the statute itself provided
only an administrative remedy, and acknowledged this as a possible
41. Hurley v. Allied Chem. Corp., 262 S.E.2d 757 (W. Va. 1980).
42. 280 S.E.2d at 254. This test is clearly derived from the analysis used by the United States

Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). It is quite similar to the test applied in
Oklahoma. See Holbert v. Echeverria, 744 P.2d 960, 963 (Okla. 1987); infra notes 101-109 and
accompanying text.
43. Before applying the four-part test to determine if the State Act permitted a private right of
action, the court went out of its way to note that West Virginia had a strong history of implying
private remedies. 280 S.E.2d at 255 (citing Costello v. City of Wheeling, 145 W. Va. 455, 461, 117
S.E.2d 513, 517 (1960); Barniak v. Grossman, 141 W. Va. 760, 765, 93 S.E.2d 49, 53 (1956)). This
discussion set the tone for the whole opinion.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 257. A similar problem exists in Oklahoma.
46. Id.
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counterbalance to the strong policy statement that unfair insurance practices should not be permitted.4 7 However, because the West Virginia Act
also included language to the effect that administrative remedies will not
"absolve any person affected by such order or hearing from any other
liability, penalty or forfeiture under law,"4 the court ultimately concluded that the administrative remedy was not to be considered
exclusive.
The Jenkins court dealt easily with the third factor, whether a private cause of action would be consistent with the underlying purposes of
the legislative act. The court determined that allowing a private cause of
action would enhance the underlying goal of preventing improper settlement practices. The court concluded without hesitation that "[t]he right
of a person injured as a result of an unfair settlement practice to recover
damages acts as a deterrent against the violations of the act."4 9
The final factor, whether the private cause of action would intrude
into an area exclusively delegated to the federal government, was even
more easily resolved, since the regulation of insurance has been left to the
states.5 0
The detailed treatment given to the issue of whether a private cause
of action should be inferred under the West Virginia Act gives some indication of its complexity. Although the West Virginia Act includes language very similar to the versions of the Act passed in Arizona and
California, the West Virginia court was not content to conclude that a
private right of action should be inferred solely because the West Virginia Act had a "savings clause" specifying that administrative enforcement will not absolve insurance companies from other liability.
While recognizing the complexity of the issue undoubtedly makes
the judicial task of statutory construction more difficult, following carefully thought-out rules for inferring a private cause of action not only
gives legislatures guidance in drafting statutes, but also helps practitioners and litigants to evaluate actual or potential claims. For these reasons,
the approach taken by the West Virginia Court of Appeals merits careful
evaluation. Unfortunately, simplistic tests have an obvious appeal that
some jurisdictions seem unable to resist.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id. (citing W. VA. CODE § 33-11-6(c)).
Id. at 258.
Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011 et seq.).
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C. Inferring a PrivateRight of Action Without SupportingAnalysis
As with virtually any legal issue, there are some state courts which
appear to have reached their decisions about whether to infer a private
cause of action "just because." This approach is characterized by an
opinion which announces the court's conclusion without much, if any,
supporting analysis. It is typified by the Montana Supreme Court's opinion in First Security Bank of Bozeman v. Goddard.5"
In Goddard, the Montana court "explained" that insurance companies have statutory duties, independent of the insurance contract itself, to
settle claims as soon "as possible and in accordance with the terms of the
insurance contract." 52 The court concluded without further analysis that
a breach of that statutory requirement gives rise to tort liability.5 3 It is
unclear from a reading of Goddard what factors influenced the Montana
court.
A less drastic example of this approach can be seen in Farmer's
Union CentralExchange, Inc. v. Reliance Insurance Co.,54 a case arising
in the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota. In
Farmer's Union, the district court was faced with the admittedly difficult
task of determining what the North Dakota courts would do if faced
with the issue of construing the North Dakota statute prohibiting unfair
claims settlement practices.
The district court acknowledged that the North Dakota statute did
not expressly recognize a private right of action but, after noting that the
statute was enacted to protect claimants, concluded that the statute imposed a duty upon insurance companies "not to engage in unfair insurance claim settlement practices as defined by the statute."5 5 While it is
possible that the North Dakota district court was relying heavily on an
unreported state district court decision which apparently recognized a
private cause of action, 6 the opinion simply does not give much guidance in determining the rationale for inferring a private cause of action.
Individuals seeking to utilize these decisions to predict when a private cause of action will be inferred in the future are given little guidance.
Certainly the relative ease with which the issue is resolved by the court is
more than offset by the inherent ambiguities and uncertainties which will
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

181 Mont. 407, 593 P.2d 1040 (1979).
Id. at 420, 593 P.2d at 1047 (citing MoNT. CODE ANN. § 33-21-105).
Id.
626 F. Supp. 583 (D.N.D. 1985).
Id. at 590.
Id. (citing Weber v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., Civ. No. 13684 (S.C.D.N.D. May 27, 1982)).
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face any practitioner or litigant in attempting to understand or utilize
such decisions in the future.
IV.

CONSTRUING STATE AcTs TO DENY A PRIVATE

RIGHT OF AcTION

The courts which have construed their State Acts to permit a private cause of action are in the minority. The majority of courts which
have addressed the issue have refused to permit private enforcement actions. The reasons offered by the courts refusing to infer a private remedy are as diverse as the reasons offered by other courts for allowing such
actions.
A.

Denying a Private Right of Action Without SupportingAnalysis

Just as some courts permitting private recovery under State Acts
have done so without offering much in the way of explanation or reasoning, other courts have denied private rights of action without explaining
their conclusions. For example, in Russell v. Hartford Casualty Insurance Co., the Texas Court of Civil Appeals held that the Texas Act did
not confer a private cause of action on individuals because "the State
Board of Insurance, upon finding an insurer in violation of the Act, is
empowered to issue a cease and desist order to the insurer directing it to
stop such unlawful practices."5 8 While it is possible to construe this conclusion as being based on the principal that the only remedy mentioned is
to be deemed the only remedy intended, the court offers no guidance for
when the principal should be followed. Additionally, it is not at all clear
that this is the proper way to interpret Russell. It may also be plausible
to conclude that the court viewed state administrative enforcement as
wholly adequate so that a private cause of action would be unnecessary.
Similarly, in Frizzy Hairstylists,Inc. v. Eagle Star Insurance Co."9 a
New York court held that the punishment of an insurer for refusing to
pay under the terms of a policy was "properly within the province and
jurisdiction of the State Superintendent of Insurance." 60 The court offered no real explanation for why a private right of recovery should not
be recognized in addition to the express administrative remedies. One is
left to wonder whether the court believed that the state legislature would
57. 548 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
58. Id. at 742 (citing TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21-2 § 6(a)).
59. 93 Misc. 2d 59, 403 N.Y.S.2d 389 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977).

60. Id. at 60, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 390.
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have expressly provided for private enforcement if such remedies were
intended, or that the express remedies were adequate therefore making
other remedies unnecessary, or whether the court was relying on some
other reasoning entirely.
The problem with these cases is not that the result reached was obviously wrong, but rather that the lack of analysis offers little guidance to
practitioners in construing other statutes or in predicting whether the
same statute will be held to give rise to a private cause of action in any
other situation. For this reason, the decisions of courts in other jurisdictions offer more guidance in predicting how the Oklahoma courts will
and should react to this problem of interpretation.
B. Exclusivity of Administrative Remedy
In Farmer'sGroup, Inc. v. Trimble,6" the Colorado Court of Appeals
found that since the Colorado Act expressly authorized the insurance
commissioner to investigate and punish violations, the legislature intended there to be no other implied remedies. The court concluded that
the legislature could have added private remedies and its failure to do so
indicated its intent to exclude them.62
While this reasoning is also somewhat simplistic, it is in accordance
with a primary rule of statutory construction which requires a court to
ascertain legislative intent when a statute is ambiguous. However, by
using this rule of construction to the exclusion of all others, the Colorado
court may have failed to take into consideration all of the factors which
may have been relevant.
C. Inconsistency with Legislative Scheme
One of the more comprehensive approaches adopted by some jurisdictions requires a determination of whether a private cause of action
would be consistent with the overall legislative scheme. This approach is
substantially broader than merely asking whether a specific remedy has
been clearly provided in a statute and, by being expressed, excludes other
remedies from being inferred.
Alaska is one jurisdiction employing the broader approach. In OK
Lumber Co. v. Providence Washington Insurance Co.,63 the Alaska
Supreme Court began its analysis by stating that the Alaska Act does not
61. 658 P.2d 1370 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982), aff'd, 691 P.2d 1138 (Colo. 1984).
62. Id. at 1378.
63. 759 P.2d 523 (Alaska 1988).
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expressly provide a private cause of action and that the relevant inquiry
must therefore be whether the statute contains an implied private right of
action. After noting that the reactions of other courts to this issue have
been mixed, the court concluded that there were substantial reasons for
declining to expand the Alaska Act.
In the opinion of the court, the statute itself suggested that a private
cause of action was not intended. Because the statute prohibited only
frequently committed acts, it did not lend itself to an action based on a
single claim. Moreover, the remedies provided were detailed explicitly,
thus implying that they were intended to be exclusive. The court also
noted that the statute limited the sanctions to be imposed. No such limits are imposed on compensatory and punitive damages available in a
private cause of action." Given these facts, the Alaska court declined
"to upset the implicit legislative judgment that the broad proscriptions of
the act are tolerable because of the limited sanctions imposed when violations occur." 6
Oregon is another jurisdiction denying a private right of action on
the grounds that it would be inconsistent with the legislative intent embodied in the state statute. The Oregon Supreme Court held in Farrisv.
United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.6 6 that although the legislature
intended to prohibit intentional breaches of the contract to settle insured's claims, the statute did not permit recovery of tort damages by
claimants.6 7 Although the court's treatment of the issue is somewhat less
comprehensive than that of the Alaska court, it concluded that the Oregon legislature had not intended to put additional pressure on insurers to
perform insurance contracts by allowing recovery of damages for emotional distress or other tort remedies. The court found that the civil
damages recoverable by the state under the Oregon Act adequately
served the intended purposes of the Act.6"
The Minnesota Supreme Court has also declined to infer a private
right of recovery on the grounds that such a remedy would not be consistent with the legislative scheme. Unfortunately, the relevant Minnesota
decision, Morris v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co.,6 9 is rather
confusing.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 527.
Id.
284 Or. 453, 587 P.2d 1015 (1978).
Id. at 458, 587 P.2d at 1018.
Id.
386 N.W.2d 233 (Minn. 1986).
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The Morris court began its analysis of the Minnesota Act by noting
that the Act provides administrative sanctions but "says nothing about a
private person having a right to sue the insurer for a violation." 70 The
court also found it significant that the Model Act, from which the Minnesota Act was derived, was not intended by its drafters to create a private right of action. 7 1 Additionally, the court noted that the "savings
clause," specifying that a commissioner's order under the Minnesota Act
will not relieve an insurer from liability under any other state laws, did
not by itself create a new cause of action.7 2
The court then began a somewhat involved analysis of the legislative
history of the Minnesota Act and a second Minnesota statute dealing
with the state attorney general's authority.7 3 The plaintiff in Morris
based his claim for relief on language in the state attorney general statute
giving private citizens concurrent enforcement powers over certain types
of actions. According to the Morris court, the flaw in the plaintiff's reasoning was that the statute upon which he predicated his claim did not
mention the Minnesota Act as one of the acts for which private enforcement is contemplated.7 4 The Minnesota court eventually concluded that
the statutory authority cited by the plaintiff did not express an intent to
create a private cause of action under the Minnesota Act.7 5
Finally, the court examined the consequences of inferring a private
cause of action. The first consequence noted by the court was that a
private right of action would enable private citizens to share the enforcement duties of the Minnesota Commissioner of Commerce and State Attorney General. 76 The court did not say whether this would be desirable,
but noted that "the statutory scheme seems ill-designed for a private
cause of action, particularly if a private plaintiff must prove multiple violations of the Act amounting to a 'general business practice.' ",77 However, the court then noted that the Minnesota Act had been amended to
permit the Commissioner of Commerce to punish single, isolated violations,78 making its previously stated reasoning seem suspect.
70. Id. at 235.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 236. Perhaps most significant to the court was the fact that the Minnesota legislature
had earlier rejected two bills which would have expressly created a private civil remedy for violations
of the Minnesota Act. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 237.
78. Id.
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Ultimately, the Minnesota court seems to have been persuaded by
the fact that permitting a private cause of action would result in significant deviation from Minnesota common law. This would be so because
the Minnesota Act "would apparently grant third party claimants a direct cause of action against an insurer that could be brought at any
time." 7 9 The availability of punitive damages would also represent a
change from Minnesota common law.80 The Minnesota court decided
that the Minnesota Act should be construed to harmonize with the common law because no clear intent to modify it had been expressed by the
legislature.
The Minnesota court, while purporting to deny a private right of
action in order to be consistent with the legislative intent behind the
Minnesota Act, relied on a rule of statutory construction which states
that legislative intent is presumed to be consistent with common law unless a different intention is clearly expressed. Other rules of statutory
construction have also been relied upon by courts in reaching the conclusion that legislative intent precludes any private right of recovery under
the relevant State Act.
For example, in Earth Scientists (PetroServices) Ltd. v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, applying Kansas law, concluded that the Kansas courts
would not interpret the Kansas Act to give rise to a private right of action. The court reasoned that since the Kansas Act did not expressly
provide a private right of action with monetary damages, it was to be
presumed that the legislature did not intend any such remedy to be available. 2 The presumed legislative intent was derived from several principles of statutory construction.
The first rule of statutory construction used to determine the legislature's intent in Earth Scientists was that a statute should be construed in
accordance with its plain language.83 Because the Kansas Act clearly
provides certain remedies without mentioning a private right of action,
the federal court concluded that it was unlikely that the Kansas legislature intended the statute to give rise to an implied private right of action.
The court also relied upon the rule of statutory construction that the
79. Id. The court does not explain why this must be the case. Arguably, the Minnesota Act
could be interpreted to allow actions by the insureds but not third parties.
80. Id.
81. 619 F. Supp. 1465 (D. Kan. 1985).
82. Id. at 1470.
83. Id. at 1471.
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expression of one idea excludes any implication that other ideas, which
are not expressed, should also be included. 4 Therefore, the express mention of an administrative remedy and the legislature's failure to provide
for private remedies in the Kansas Act "imply that the legislature intended to exclude any private remedies." 5
Finally, the district court relied on the rule that a uniform law
adopted by the Kansas legislature should be construed in accordance
with the construction placed on it by its drafters, unless that intent would
be contrary to the Kansas constitution or public policy. 6 Since the
NAIC, having drafted the Model Act, has consistently argued that the
Model Act was never intended to create a private cause of action, 7 the
court concluded that the Kansas Act could not be construed to permit
private recovery.
A similar result was reached on more simplistic grounds by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in Kranzush v. Badger State Mutual Casualty
Co.8 The Wisconsin court held that it would not be proper to interpret
the Wisconsin Act to permit a private right of action because any such
interpretation "would be in clear derogation of the common law."8 9
Noting that legislative intent is to be determined primarily from the form
or language of the statute, the court concluded that since the Wisconsin
Act did not expressly confer a private right of action or impose a duty,
the breach of which would be actionable, it would not be consistent with
the presumed legislative intent to infer a private right of action against
the insurer. 90
D. No Need for PrivateRight of Action
Still other jurisdictions have declined to expand State Acts to permit
private recovery on the ground that such an expansive treatment is not
necessary in order to fulfill the legislation's goals. The Idaho Supreme
Court has adopted this approach. 9 1 Idaho courts recognize that insurers
have a common law duty to their insureds to settle first party claims in
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. (citing In re Reed's Estate, 233 Kan. 531, 541, 664 P.2d 824, 832, cert. denied, 464 U.S.

978 (1983)).
87. See, eg., Shernoff, Insurance Company Bad Faith Law, TRIAL, May 1981, at 24.
88. 103 Wis. 2d 56, 307 N.W.2d 256 (1981).

89. Id. at 74, 307 N.W.2d at 265.
90. Id. at 74-81, 307 N.W.2d at 265-69.

91. See, e.g., White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, 730 P.2d 1014 (1986). See also
Greene v. Truck Ins. Exch., 114 Idaho 63, 753 P.2d 274 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988); Windsor v. Guar.
Trust Life Ins. Co., 684 F. Supp. 630 (D. Idaho 1988).
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good faith. 92 The Idaho Supreme Court has also held that a breach of
this duty will give rise to an action in tort.9 3 Therefore, the Idaho
Supreme Court has concluded that "a statutory remedy [under the Idaho
Act] is neither prescribed nor necessary." 94
Pennsylvania has also used this rationale." The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has held that the Pennsylvania Act does not need to be
supplemented by a judicially-created cause of action because the enforcement mechanisms expressly provided appear adequate. 96 Citing an article criticizing California's approach of inferring a private right of action,
the Pennsylvania court concluded: "State insurance departments are intended to serve the public and handle complaints from insureds as to
insurer practices on a regular basis. Likewise, state legislatures are capable of prohibiting what are considered to be unfair claims handling practices and of imposing penalties for violations." 97
V.

A.

CONSTRUING THE OKLAHOMA ACT

When to Infer a Private Cause of Action

Even a cursory examination of the various decisions from other jurisdictions dealing with the question of when to infer a private right of
action under the various State Acts indicates that there are many different approaches which can be and have been taken. The approaches
range from extremely simplistic98 to very complex examinations of legislative intent.99 To a large extent, the question of what test to apply in
Oklahoma has been resolved by a recent decision of the Oklahoma
Supreme Court dealing with whether the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act 1"° should be construed to permit a private right of action.
In Holbert v. Echeverria 0 1 the Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed
92. White, 112 Idaho at 101, 730 P.2d at 1021.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Casualty Ins. Co., 494 Pa. 501, 431 A.2d 966
(1981).
96. Id. at 507, 431 A.2d at 969-70.
97. Id. at 507-08, 431 A.2d at 970 (citing Kircher, Insurer's Mistaken Judgment - A New
Tort?, 59 MARQ. L. REv. 775, 786 (1976).
98. Those jurisdictions applying the "just because" tests seem to prefer this approach. See
supra note 51-56 and accompanying text.
99. See Morris v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 386 N.W.2d 233 (Minn. 1986) (finding that
there was no private right of action); Jenkins v. J. C. Penney Casualty Ins. Co., 280 S.E.2d 252 (WV.
Va. 1981) (finding that a private right of action did exist).
100. OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 751-763 (1981).
101. 744 P.2d 960 (Okla. 1987).
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for the first time the question of when a private right of action should be
derived from a regulatory statute in Oklahoma. The court found that the
test established by the United States Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash ' 0 2 for
evaluating federal statutes should be utilized in evaluating Oklahoma
statutes.
Under the Cort test, a private cause of action can be inferred under a
federal statute only if each of four criteria are met: (1) the plaintiff must
be a member of a class "for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted"; 03 (2) there must be some indication of legislative intent, which
may be either express or implied, suggesting that a private remedy was
intended; (3) a private remedy must be consistent with the underlying
purposes of the legislation; and (4) the cause of action must not be one
which is traditionally relegated to state law."° The Oklahoma court
found the fourth factor to be inapplicable to state legislation, and it was
therefore disregarded in Holbert. °5 The Holbert test for whether a private right of action may be inferred from an Oklahoma regulatory statute, then, is based upon the first three factors of the Cort test.
In applying this test to the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act, the
Holbert court addressed at length the meaning of the first requirement.
The court determined that the question of whether a plaintiff is a member of a class of persons for whose "especial benefit" legislation was enacted is not satisfied merely by the fact that the plaintiff is "especially
harmed" as a result of the act's violation. 106 In the opinion of the Holbert court, "[w]hen a statute is created for the benefit of the public at
large, no special class is created in its wake."" °7 Concluding that there is
no broader class than "consumers," to which the Consumer Protection
Act is addressed, the court found that the first factor of the analysis
could not be met. However, the court did not end its analysis there.
The Oklahoma court also addressed the second factor which requires some indication of legislative intent to create a private remedy.
The court first noted that recent Supreme Court decisions have particularly emphasized this factor when applying the test.'
The Oklahoma
102. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
103. 744 P.2d at 963 (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78).
104. Id. at 963.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 964 (citing Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 535-36 (1984)); Middlesex
County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 13 (1981); Texas Indus., Inc. v.

Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 293
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court then determined that legislative intent is generally to be ascertained
by examining the precise wording of the legislation, and studying the
legislative history. Rules of statutory construction are to be applied in
resolving any ambiguity.
The Holbert court relied on the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio
alterius"109 which means that the mention of one thing in a statute im-

plies exclusion of things which are not mentioned. This led to the conclusion that the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act did not give rise to
a private right of action. Since the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act
specifies that enforcement is to be through attorney general action, this
indicates an intent to exclude any unexpressed private rights of action.110
The Oklahoma court did not examine whether the third factor of
the Cort test was met under the Consumer Protection Act. However, an
examination of each of the elements of the Holbert test gives substantial
guidance in evaluating whether a private right of action should be inferred under the Oklahoma Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act.
B. Determining For Whose Benefit the Oklahoma Act was Passed

The Oklahoma Act, as discussed earlier,11' prohibits certain acts of
insurers. Although some of the prohibitions are specifically addressed to
actions taken by insurers with regard to their policyholders,' 12 the majority of prohibited acts can affect any kind of claimant." 3 It therefore appears that the parties most directly harmed by violation of the act are
policyholders and third party claimants injured by some act or inaction
of the insured. However, it is not completely clear that the Oklahoma
Act was intended to operate for the especial benefit of these persons as a
narrow class, rather than the public as a whole.
As with the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act, it is possible to
conclude that the Oklahoma Act was intended to benefit the public as a
whole. Virtually everyone is a potential claimant under insurance policies, and an examination of the acts prohibited under the Oklahoma Act
indicates that it might not be appropriate to limit enforcement of the Act
(1981); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15 (1979); Touche Ross & Co.
v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979)).
109. Holbert, 744 P.2d at 965. This maxim is intended to be used as an aid in determining

legislative intent. See, e.g., In re Arbuckle Master Conservancy Dist., 474 P.2d 385, 391-92 (Okla.
1970).
110. Holbert, 744 P.2d at 965.
111. See supra notes 9-27 and accompanying text.
112. See, eg., OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 1222.5 (Supp. 1988).

113. Id. at § 1222.1-4.
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to policyholders if a private right of action is inferred. This conclusion
seems logical in view of the fact that a majority of the prohibited prac14
tices can relate to any claimant rather than to the policyholder alone.
On the other hand, it is also possible to conclude that the Oklahoma
Act was really intended only to benefit the insureds. While it is indisputable that the Oklahoma Act prohibits certain practices which relate to
all claimants, with a little imagination, the ultimate beneficiary of the
prohibited unfair claims settlement practices can be viewed as the insured. In most if not all instances, the insured is ultimately liable, and
unfair settlement practices engaged in by the insurance company, even if
directed against third-party claimants, may result in actions against the
insured. Statutory prohibitions designed to curtail unfair settlement
practices would therefore have the ultimate effect of benefiting the insured, even if the prohibition is broadly worded to cover settlement practices relating to claims by third parties. It is therefore not completely
clear that the Oklahoma courts must conclude that the Oklahoma Act is
too broad to have been intended to benefit a narrow class.
One possible approach which would allow the Oklahoma courts to
find that the legislation was intended to benefit an "especial class" would
be for the courts to limit actions to insureds, and to preclude private
enforcement by third parties. Certain cases in other jurisdictions have
held that there is no private right of action for third parties, while allowing direct recourse by the insureds." 5 Similarly, although both the
Arizona and Connecticut courts have construed their State Acts to create
a cause of action for insureds, the rights of third party claimants in those
jurisdictions have not been addressed. 16
Alternatively, it is also possible, and more likely, that the Oklahoma
courts will find that the Oklahoma Act was passed to protect both policyholders and third party claimants. If this is the conclusion reached by
the Oklahoma courts, a private right of action could exist only if the
courts also conclude that this constitutes a sufficiently specific class of
persons. This would also seem to involve some "stretching" by the
courts, but it is clearly a possibility. In any event, while it seems more
probable and more logical that the Oklahoma courts will find that the
114. Id.
115. See, eg., Tweet v. Webster, 614 F. Supp. 1190, 1191 (D. Nev. 1985); Scroggins v. All State
Ins. Co., 74 Il. App.3d 1027, 1031-34, 393 N.E.2d 718, 720-21 (1979); Kranzush v. Badger State
Mut. Casualty Co., 103 Wis. 2d 56, 64-65, 307 N.W.2d 256, 265 (1981).
116. See Sparks v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 132 Ariz. 529, 647 P.2d 1127 (1982); Griswold
v. Union Labor Life Ins. Co., 186 Conn. 507, 442 A.2d 920 (1982).
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Oklahoma Act was intended to protect the public as a whole, the second
and third elements of the test should be evaluated in order to predict not
only how the Oklahoma courts will react, but also how the Oklahoma
courts should react.
C. Determining the Intent of the Oklahoma Legislature
The second element of the Holbert test requires a determination of
whether the Oklahoma legislature intended to permit a private right of
action. Unfortunately, this is a difficult question to answer because of the
lack of definitive legislative history in Oklahoma. This deficiency necessarily forces reliance on rules of statutory construction pursuant to which
Oklahoma courts will imply legislative intent.
The principal rule of statutory construction utilized in Oklahoma, as
well as in other jurisdictions, is that the intent of the legislature in enact117
ing a particular statute will govern its interpretation by the courts.
Thus, it is not surprising that most rules of statutory construction are
framed in terms of what the legislature presumably intended. For example, it has been held that in determining the legislative intent, inquiry
should begin with the language employed in the particular statute.1 18
The courts may also look to the problems sought to be remedied by the
legislation in ascertaining the legislature's intent.11 9 The purpose of the
statute may also be examined in ascertaining legislative intent.120
Although there are all manner of rules of statutory construction
which may be relevant in interpreting the Oklahoma Act, at least one
rule appears to support the conclusion that a private right of action
should be permitted. In interpreting a statute, the courts must consider
the purpose behind the legislation.12 Since the purpose of the Oklahoma
Act was clearly to minimize unfair claims settlement practices by
Oklahoma insurers, a court could reasonably conclude that it would
117. See Darnell v. Chrysler Corp., 687 P.2d 132 (Okla. 1984); Walker v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 671 P.2d 672 (Okla. 1983); Udall v. Udall, 613 P.2d 742 (Okla. 1980).
118. See, e.g., Wilson v. Al McCord, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 621, 623 (W.D. Okla. 1985); Rea v. Big
Chief Drilling Co., 673 P.2d 515, 518 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983); Beall v. Town of Hennessey, 601 P.2d
758, 759 (Okla. Ct. App. 1979).
119. Stockyards Loan Co. v. Nichols, 243 F. 511, 516 (8th Cir. 1917); Blevins v. W. A. Graham
Co., 72 Okla. 308, 309, 182 P. 247, 248 (1919).
120. Oliver v. Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 359 P.2d 183 (Okla. 1961); Equitable
Royalty Corp. v. State, 352 P.2d 365 (Okla. 1960); State v. Dinwiddie, 186 Okla. 63, 95 P.2d 867
(1939).
121. Lekan v. P & L Fire Protection Co., 609 P.2d 1289 (Okla. 1980); Owens v. State, 665 P.2d
832, 834 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983); Oklahoma Journal Publishing Co. v. City of Oklahoma City, 620
P.2d 452, 454, (Okla. Ct. App. 1979).

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1988

21

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 24 [1988], Iss. 3, Art. 2
TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 24:373

1 22
serve this purpose if a private right of action were inferred.
Concluding that a private cause of action should be inferred could
be supported by the fact that the administrative enforcement mechanism
provided in the Oklahoma Act does not seem substantial. 123 In essence,
the Oklahoma Act gives the Oklahoma Insurance Commissioner authority to issue a cease and desist order directing the insurer to stop unlawful
settlement practices, and to "limit, regulate, and control the insurer's line
of business"' 124 in the event the insurer refuses or fails to comply with the
cease and desist order. No monetary penalties or fines for past violations
are imposed by the statute. Given these relatively insubstantial enforcement provisions, it might easily be concluded that private enforcement
mechanisms would add substantially to the deterrent effect of the Act.
Most of the rules of statutory construction which appear to be relevant to the questions raised by the ambiguities in the Oklahoma Act,
however, support the conclusion that no private right of action was intended. One of the simplest rules of construction which supports this
result is that the plain words of a statute will generally govern the statute's construction. 125 Obviously, a reading of the plain words of the
Oklahoma Act indicates that administrative remedies were provided, and
no mention of private remedies is made.
Similarly, the enumeration of specific items in a statute is frequently
interpreted as evidencing an intent to exclude those items which are not
enumerated. 126 Of course, this rule of statutory construction is intended
to aid in determining legislative intent, and is not a rule of substantive
law.' 27 Nonetheless, under this rule, the fact that the legislature expressly provided administrative remedies without mentioning any private
cause of action gives rise to the implication that the legislature intended
to create no such private rights.
Finally, it has been held that it is appropriate to examine authorities

122. The West Virginia appellate decision in Jenkins v. J. C. Penney Casualty Ins. Co. adopted
this reasoning. 280 S.E.2d 252 (W. Va. 1981).
123. OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 1226 (Supp. 1987).
124. Id. § 1226.A.

125. See, eg., American-First Title & Trust Co. v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 415 P.2d 930
(Okla. 1965) (a statute is open to construction only where the language is ambiguous); City of
Duncan v. Barnes, 293 P.2d 590 (Okla. 1956) (language given its plain meaning when the statute is
not ambiguous and its affect not absurd); Loeffler v. Federal Supply Co., 187 Okla. 373, 102 P.2d
862 (1940) (words given their ordinary meaning unless this would defeat legislative intent).
126. City of Tulsa v. Midland Valley R.R. Co., 168 F.2d 252, 252 (10th Cir. 1948) (applying
Oklahoma law); State v. Cline, 322 P.2d 208, 213 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958) (citing 82 C.J.S. Statutes
§ 333 (1953)).
127. Spiers v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 206 Okla. 510, 513, 244 P.2d 852, 856 (1951); Branson v.
Branson, 190 Okla. 347, 352, 123 P.2d 643, 648 (1942).
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relative to the source of Oklahoma law. For example, a statute adopted
from another state will be presumed to have been adopted with the construction previously placed on it by courts of that other state.128 In this
case, the Oklahoma Act is derived from the Model Act proposed by the
NAIC. The NAIC did not intend the Model Act to give rise to a private
right of action, and therefore the Oklahoma legislature might be presumed to have accepted that interpretation.12 9 It is, however, unclear
how much reliance should be placed on the NAIC's interpretation, as
this general rule of statutory construction normally applies to interpreta130
tions of statutes given by courts of sister states.
On the whole it seems more plausible to believe that the Oklahoma
legislature did not intend to create a private right of action under the
Oklahoma Act. However, this is by no means a certain conclusion, and
it therefore seems appropriate to examine the third and final prong of the
Holbert test to evaluate whether a private right of action should be inferred under the Oklahoma Act.
D. Determining the Underlying Purposes of the Act
The second and third prongs of the Holbert test are closely related,
especially since one of the rules of statutory construction requires an examination of the purposes of the legislation in evaluating the probable
intent of the legislature.13 1 However, the question of whether a private
remedy will be consistent with the legislative scheme can also include
consideration of factors broader than the intent of the legislature relative
only to the particular statute being evaluated. For example, if the function which would be served by a private remedy is fulfilled by other
rights and remedies available to aggrieved persons, the necessity for a
private remedy may be obviated.
The Oklahoma courts have relatively recently recognized a cause of
action for bad faith breach of an insurance contract by insurers.1 32 In
Christian v. American Home Assurance Co., 133 the Oklahoma Supreme
Court held that "an insurer has an implied duty to deal fairly and act in
good faith with its insured and that the violation of this duty gives rise to
128. See Brook v. James A. Cullimore & Co., 436 P.2d 32, 34 (Okla. 1967); Knox v. McMillan,
272 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Okla. 1954); Ciesler v. Simpson, 187 Okla. 641, 642, 105 P.2d 227, 228 (1940).
129. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
131. See, eg., supra note 120 and accompanying text.
132. Christian v. American Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1977).

133. Id.
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an action in tort."' 13 4 While Christian dealt only with obligations owed

by disability insurers, the rule was later expanded to cover all insurers.13
Under the rules adopted in Christian,it is now possible to sue an insurer

either for breach
of contract or for the tort of breach of the implied duty
136
of good faith.

The duty owed by insurers is not without limitations. For example,
third parties cannot bring a tort action against insurers, as an insurance
137
company generally owes the duty of good faith only to its insureds.
However, the tort recognized in Christian clearly covers bad faith refus-

als to settle claims. 138 To some extent, therefore, an implied right of action under the Oklahoma Act should be unnecessary. An examination of
the Oklahoma Act indicates that most of the more serious types of unfair
claims settlement practices which are prohibited by the Oklahoma Act

can also give rise to liability under the rules announced by the Oklahoma
Supreme Court in Christian.
The first type of act prohibited by the Oklahoma statute is knowing

misrepresentation concerning pertinent facts or policy provisions relating
to coverage. 13 9 If the misrepresentation is material, and causes injury to

the insured, presumably Oklahoma law would recognize a right to recover under Christian, even without granting private enforcement rights
under the Oklahoma Act. 14°
The fourth and fifth prohibited practices also seem likely to support
a recovery under the tort recognized in Christian. The fourth type of

practice is failing to attempt in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and
equitable settlements for claims where liability has become reasonably
clear.' 41 The fifth prohibition is against compelling policyholders to initiate suits to recover amounts due by offering substantially less than the

amounts ultimately recovered, when the policyholders have made claims
134. Id. 904.
135. MeCorkel v. Great Atl. Ins. Co., 637 P.2d 583 (Okla. 1981).
136. In Christian, the Oklahoma Supreme Court "clearly recognized the two causes of action
which may be asserted premised on the existence of an insurance contract: an action based on the
contract; and an action for breach of the implied duty to deal fairly and in good faith." Lewis v.
Farmers Ins. Co., 681 P.2d 67, 69 (Okla. 1983).
137. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Amick, 680 P.2d 362, 365 (Okla. 1984).
138. "An insurance company has a duty to defend its insured and settle claims in good faith."
Wilson v. Gipson, 753 P.2d 1349, 1356 (Okla. 1988) (citing Christian v. American Home Assurance
Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1977)). In fact, the liability found in Christian was premised on the insurance company's bad faith refusal to pay the insured's valid claim. Christian, 577 P.2d at 903-904.
139. OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 1222.1 (Supp. 1988).
140. It is also possible that such a knowing iisrepresentation would give rise to the independent
tort of deceit, which is codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 76, §§ 2-3 (1981).
141. OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 1222.4 (Supp. 1988).
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for amounts reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately recovered. 142
Where an insurance company's actions run afoul of either of these
prohibitions, it would seem likely that those actions would also give rise
to liability in tort. The failure to settle in good faith was recognized as
giving rise to liability in Christian,143 and compelling policyholders to
initiate suits to recover amounts due under the policy would seem to be
one manner of refusing to settle in good faith.
The analysis of the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Christian, however,
seems unlikely to support three types of actions prohibited by the
Oklahoma Act. These are failure to acknowledge communications with
reasonable promptness,'" failure to implement reasonable standards for
prompt investigation of claims, 145 and failure of the insurer to maintain
complete records of complaints for three years or since the last examination by the insurance commissioner.1 4 6 It is difficult to see how these
prohibited acts could cause direct injury to an insured, and, unless the
failure to acknowledge communications or failure to implement reasonable standards for prompt investigation results in a failure to settle in
good faith, violation of these statutory prohibitions does not seem likely
to result in an independent tort. Therefore, while the Oklahoma
Supreme Court has recognized the potential liability of insurers for certain acts which may be prohibited by the Oklahoma Act, the current tort
liability probably does not extend to all of the practices prohibited by the
Oklahoma Act.
The question then becomes whether inferring a private right of action under the Oklahoma Act would materially enhance its effectiveness
in prohibiting unfair claims settlement practices. There are several reasons why a private cause of action might not effectively further the
objectives behind the Oklahoma Act. First, the activities which would
not subject insurers to tort liability are not really as significant as those
practices which would support recovery for the breach of the covenant of
good faith. Failure of an insurer to respond to communications by
claimants with reasonable promptness should not, by itself, cause the
same level of harm that failure to attempt prompt, fair, and equitable
settlements does. It is only where the failure to communicate is indicative of a failure to attempt prompt settlements that the claimant is likely
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. § 1222.5.
577 P.2d 899, 904 (Okla. 1977).
OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 1222.2 (Supp. 1988):
Id. § 1222.3.
Id. § 1222.6.
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to be significantly injured. In the latter event, of course, tort liability
would probably already exist.
Similarly, failure to adopt and implement standards for prompt investigation of claims is not a significant problem unless the lack of standards results in failure to effectuate equitable settlements. The lack of
standards itself is not a problem if the ultimate action taken by the insurer, even if the result of a haphazard investigation, is in fact fair and
equitable. Again, however, if the ultimate settlement is not prompt, fair
and equitable, the possibility of tort liability has already arisen.
Finally, the failure of an insurer to maintain a complete record of
complaints is not a substantive problem. It is merely a procedural inadequacy which the legislature believed to be of sufficient significance to
warrant administrative enforcement.
Another reason why a private cause of action would hamper the
effectiveness of the Oklahoma Act is that the problem of setting standards for violations would become significant. The Oklahoma Act itself,
for example, offers no standards for what constitutes failure to acknowledge communications with respect to claims "with reasonable promptness." 14 7 Similarly, there are no guidelines for satisfying "reasonable

standards for prompt investigation of claims."' 48 While it is true that
courts and juries are often called upon to determine standards of reasonableness where liability is to be imposed for breach of statutory duty, the
courts would be required to ascertain what standards the legislature intended to impose. In the case of the Oklahoma Act, such standards are
simply unstated. Therefore, reliance on administrative enforcement
seems particularly appropriate since the administrative agency would be
expected to have the experience necessary to develop reasonable and consistent standards for compliance.
Additionally, implying a private cause of action would require a determination of whether multiple violations of the statute would be required for liability. While the problem is not as obvious in Oklahoma as
in certain other jurisdictions where the State Acts expressly prohibit
practices "committed with such frequency as to indicate the general business practice," 149 the issue is not completely clear.
The Oklahoma Act, while prohibiting each of the listed practices "if
committed without cause," also includes the provision that the Insurance
147. Id. § 1222.2.
148. Id. § 1222.3.
149. See, eg., ALAsKA STAT. § 21-36-125 (Supp. 1984).
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Commissioner has the right to determine whether a property and casualty insurer "has engaged in unfair claim settlement practices with such
frequency as to indicate a general business practice."15 In such event,
the Insurance Commissioner can require periodic reports to assist in
closer evaluation of that insurer. 15 The enforcement procedures contained in the Oklahoma Act generally require the Insurance Commissioner to find that the number and type of complaints against an insurer
are out of proportion to those made against other insurers, or do not
meet minimum 52standards of performance set down by the Insurance
1
Commissioner.
If it is determined that the Oklahoma Act was intended to prohibit
general business practices rather than specific violations, private enforcement mechanisms would appear to be particularly inappropriate. An act
premised on general business practices and multiple violations seems illsuited to private enforcement, 153 as private litigants could not know if
there was a statutory violation based merely on their own experiences.
Finally, if a private right of action is inferred, the question will arise
as to whether enforcement actions should be limited to insureds only, or
also allowed to third-party plaintiffs. Oklahoma does not recognize the
tort of bad faith breach of contract against third parties.' 54 Therefore,
any implication of a private right of action under the Oklahoma Act
would be limited to the insureds, or else represent a substantial change
from existing Oklahoma common law.' 5 5 The difficulties associated with
drawing these limits under the Oklahoma Act would be compounded by
permitting a private right of action for the insured, but not for third
party claimants, since the Act itself is not addressed to insureds only.
It therefore appears that there are substantial reasons why inferring
a private right of action would be inconsistent with the underlying purposes of the Oklahoma Act. Thus the Oklahoma courts should be wary
of treating the statute expansively, particularly when considered in connection with the lack of clear evidence that the Oklahoma legislature
intended a private right of action to be granted.
150. OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 1223.A (Supp. 1988).
151. Id.
152. Id. § 1224.C.
153. Accord O.K. Lumber Co. v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 759 P.2d 523 (Alaska 1988).
154. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Amick, 680 P.2d 362 (Okla. 1984).
155. In general, a statute is not to be construed as changing the common law unless a clear intent
that such a change be made has been expressed. See, e. g., In re Adoption of Graves, 481 P.2d 136,
138 (Okla. 1971); Fenton v. Young Chevrolet Co., 191 Okla. 161, 163, 127 P.2d 813, 814 (1942).
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CONCLUSION

When the Oklahoma legislature enacted the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act it is entirely possible that no thought was given to
whether that Act would or should give rise to a private cause of action
for insureds or third party claimants. Although a few courts from other
jurisdictions have held that the Act as passed in their state does support
private enforcement actions, the majority rule is otherwise. While there
are some valid arguments which can be raised to support the proposition
that the Oklahoma courts should expand the Oklahoma Act to allow
private remedies, the better result would be to conclude that the
Oklahoma Act does not contemplate a private enforcement action, and
that no such cause of action exists.
It is true that the unfair claims settlement practices prohibited by
the Oklahoma Act can, in certain instances, be a significant problem for
insureds, as well as for third-party claimants. However, insureds already
have a tort cause of action against their insurers for bad faith breach of
contract, and failure of an insurance company to settle does not preclude
a third party claimant from proceeding directly against the insured.
To broaden the Oklahoma Act beyond its express terms would seem
to be an unwarranted intrusion upon the legislative prerogative. It is an
oversimplification to conclude that the Oklahoma legislature did not intend a private cause of action because it could easily have provided one if
this was its intention. However, when the test for identifying a private
cause of action developed by the Oklahoma Supreme Court is applied,
the same result should be reached.
Oklahoma courts would have to stretch the rules of statutory interpretation to find that the Oklahoma Act was intended to benefit a narrow
class of citizens. Moreover, it is doubtful that the Oklahoma legislature
actually intended to create a private remedy. In addition, inferring such
a remedy would, perhaps unnecessarily, complicate this area of the law
in such a way that the purposes of the statute would be hampered.
Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the Oklahoma courts probably
will and probably should be eager to limit unfair claims settlement practices by insurers, a private cause of action under the Oklahoma Act does
not appear to be the appropriate mechanism to accomplish this result.
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